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ABSTRACT 
Jonathan Schaffer has argued that a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in 
juridical contexts: lawyers and judges should treat the causal relation as a 
quaternary relation, not as binary one. In this paper we investigate to what 
extent a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in genetics and in physics. We 
conclude that it is beneficial in these scientific domains. We also point out that 
the nature of the benefit differs in the three context (law, genetics, physics) 
that we discuss.  
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1 Introduction 
Jonathan Schaffer has recently presented and defended a contrastive 
account of causation in two papers: ‘Contrastive Causation’ (Schaffer 
2005) and ‘Contrastive Causation in the Law’ (Schaffer 2010). In the first 
paper, the position is described as follows: 
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I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c 
rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are 
nonempty sets of contrast events. (2005, p. 297) 
The paper contains a philosophical defence of this position: Schaffer 
argues that treating causation as contrastive helps to solve five 
paradoxes with respect to causation: the paradox of absences, the 
paradox of fragility, the paradox of extensionality, the paradox of 
transitivity and the paradox of selection.  
In the second paper Schaffer argues that causal claims made by 
lawyers, judges etc. implicitly rely on a contrastive conception of 
causation: 
I argue that specification of the causal contrast as lawful 
conduct is needed so that the right alternative gets assessed, 
and I argue that specification of the effectual contrast as the 
better outcome is needed so that the right damages get 
assigned. The view is not intended as a revisionary proposal but 
rather as a description of what is implicit in our practice[.] 
(2010, p. 260) 
So Schaffer does not only argue that the general contrastive view is 
applicable to causation in the law, but also proposes a specific 
implementation of C* and E* in legal contexts: lawful conduct and better 
outcome. 
The main thesis of the 2005 paper is of a general metaphysical 
nature: causation, as an objective relation in the world, is a quaternary 
relation. The theses in the 2010 paper are at a different level. On the one 
hand, he claims that lawyers and judges implicitly treat causation as a 
quaternary relation. In other words: in the ontology of lawyers and 
judges, causation is conceived as quaternary. This is not a metaphysical 
claim, but a descriptive claim about the ontology presupposed by a 
specific group of people. On the other hand, Schaffer also approves of 
this ontology: he thinks it is a good ontology that has the advantage of 
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making lawyers and judges focus on what is really important causal 
knowledge. If lawyers and judges would see causation as a ternary or 
binary relation, they would be less focused. That is Schaffer’s view on 
causation in the law, which we will present in more detail in Section 2. 
The crucial idea of focus on important causal knowledge will be clarified 
there.  
Our investigation in this paper was prompted by the following 
remark of Schaffer: 
Arguably, causal and explanatory judgments in the sciences are 
always contrastive judgments. (2010, p. 263) 
In the footnote attached to this remark, Schaffer refers to Goodwin 
2008, which is a paper about explanation of regularities in chemistry. 
We will not use that paper because we want to focus on causation, more 
specifically causation between events. We think it is interesting to 
investigate to what extent and why a ternary or quaternary causal 
ontology is beneficial for specific groups of scientists. 
In Section 3  we analyse causal claims in genetics, an important 
subdiscipline of biology. Section 4 deals with physics. We will try to 
answer the following questions:1 
(1) Is the ontology of the causal relation in this field contrastive? 
(2) If so, what kinds of contrasts are relevant in this field? 
(3) If the ontology is contrastive, is it beneficial to make the 
contrasts explicit when making causal claims in this field? If 
there is an advantage, what does it consist in? 
 
                                                             
1 We thank an anonymous referee for proposing the three first questions as a way to 
disentangle the issues to be discussed and as a way of organizing our thoughts. 
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(4) Why is it useful to be aware of the fact that the causal ontology 
in this field is contrastive (assuming that it is is)? 
(5) Because questions (3) and (4) look a bit similar, it is useful to 
clarify what we mean. Question (3) relates to the usefulness of an 
explicit contrastive causal ontology for people who are active in 
the given field. Question (4) is meant to be reflective: if you look 
at the field from an external perspective, what do we gain (in 
terms of better understanding of what is going on in the field) if 
we realize that that the causal ontology is contrastive? 
2 Contrastive causation in the law 
2.1 We already briefly explained the idea of contrastive causation in the 
introduction. Here is a more elaborate statement: 
The contrastive thesis is thus a thesis about the number and the 
roles of the causal relata. In particular it is the thesis that there 
are four causal relata in the roles of cause, causal contrast, 
effect, and effectual contrast, as follows: 
(Contrast) The causal relation has the form: c rather than c∗ 
causes e rather than e∗ 
Causal judgment is judgment about the causal relation and so—
given Contrast—makes reference not merely to cause and effect 
(as is usually thought) but also to their respective contrasts. 
(Schaffer 2010, p. 261) 
With respect to causation in the law Schaffer argues that … 
… causation in the law requires specification of both the causal 
and the effectual contrast. Essentially, specification of the 
causal contrast as lawful conduct on part of the defendant is 
needed so that the right alternative gets assessed, and 
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specification of the effectual contrast as the better outcome for 
the plaintiff is needed so that the right damages get assigned. 
(2010, p. 269-270) 
In saying this, Schaffer actually makes two claims. On the one hand, he 
asserts that the contrastive thesis is true for causation in the law. On 
the other hand, he tells us how c* and e* are implemented in legal 
contexts: lawful conduct and better outcome. 
To support his views Schaffer presents several examples. We discuss 
two of them: one that illustrates the necessity of a contrast on the cause 
side of the relation (2.2) and one for the effect side (2.3). In 2.4 we clarify 
how Schaffer sees the benefits of the contrastive ontology. In 2.5 we 
summarise Schaffer’s view by means of the four questions above. 
2.2 Consider a lifeguard who has been napping while on duty. While he 
was napping, a boy drowned. Consider the following binary statement: 
(A) The fact that the lifeguard was napping caused the drowning of 
the boy. 
According to Schaffer, people who make such binary statements always 
have an implicit contrast on the cause side in mind. If we make this 
contrast explicit, we get ternary causal claims. Examples of such claims 
in the lifeguard case are: 
(B) The fact that the lifeguard was napping, as opposed to paying 
attention, caused the drowning of the boy. 
(C) The fact that the lifeguard was napping, as opposed to going 
away to smoke a cigarette, caused the drowning of the boy. 
There is a juridically very significant difference between these two 
ternary claims. In general it is the case that some contrasts lead to 
juridically relevant causal claims (e.g. (B)) while other contrasts lead to 
juridically irrelevant causal claims (e.g. (C)). It makes no sense to argue 
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in a courtroom about whether (C) is correct or not, because both the 
putative cause and the contrast are non-lawful behaviour. Arguing 
about (B) makes sense because the contrast is lawful conduct.  
2.3 The upshot of 2.2 is that it treating causation as (at least) a ternary 
relation allows us to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant causal 
claims. A similar argument can be given with respect to the effect side. 
If we consider the causal relation as ternary, without effectual contrast, 
it is again impossible to distinguish relevant from irrelevant claims. Let 
us look at Schaffer’s example. An unlicensed practitioner of medicine 
(Jones) performs surgery on Smith, after which Smith dies. If we want 
to call Jones’ act the cause of Smith’s death, we need to know what 
would have happened if Jones had not operated on Smith, or if he 
operated properly. If Smith gained a day because of the operation (or if 
he would have died anyway on that day) the situation for Jones is 
different than if Smith would have gone on to live another 40 years if 
the operation were performed in a proper way. An important part of 
the information the causal claim should give us is whether the 
defendant “rendered the plaintiff worse off” (2010, p. 279), not whether 
there were damages in an absolute sense. This is something that cannot 
be expressed without a specification of the alternative scenarios on the 
effect side. We need a contrast that expresses a “comparatively better 
outcome” (ibid.) for the plaintiff than the actual outcome. The reason is 
clear: if the occurrence of c rather than c* gives rise to an effect e that is 
equally good or better than the alternative effect e*, why would the 
defendant be guilty of anything? 
Together with the argument in 2.2 this implies that treating the 
causal relation as a quaternary one in the ways specified by Schaffer 
(i.e. with lawful conduct as causal contrast and better outcome as 
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effectual contrast) allows lawyers and judges to distinguish relevant 
from irrelevant causal claims.2 
2.4 Given the usefulness of the quaternary ontology, we need an 
adequate test to provide evidence for quaternary causal claims. 
Remember that we made reference to alternative scenarios to clarify 
the meaning of a causal claim in law, and to the need to restrict the 
considered alternative scenarios to lawful behaviour on the cause side 
and a comparatively better outcome on the effect side. Based on this, 
Schaffer proposes a new kind of counterfactual test procedure which 
allows us to provide the right type of evidence for our causal claims in 
juridical contexts. He describes the traditional test procedure as 
follows: 
Causal judgments made in the courtroom are often explicitly 
based on the sine qua non test. For instance, in a tort of 
negligence it will typically be asked: Would the actual damage 
to the plaintiff still have occurred had the defendant’s actual 
breach of duty not occurred? (2010, p. 260)  
The alternative he proposes is: 
I am arguing that the more useful test, which is implicitly at 
work behind the sine qua non test and so in fact is implicitly in 
use, is the following test: Would a better outcome for the 
plaintiff have occurred than the actual outcome had the 
defendant acted lawfully instead of breaching duty? Instead of 
“but for the defendant’s breach, the plaintiff’s damage would 
not have occurred,” I suggest the more explicit “if the 
 
                                                             
2 Each of the examples that Schaffer uses can be extended to show the usefulness of a 
quaternary ontology in one move. In the life-guard example, drowning of the boy can be 
contrasted with surviving on the effect side. In the surgery case, Jones’ act can be 
contrasted with him doing nothing illegal. 
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defendant had acted lawfully, the plaintiff would have met a 
better fate.” (2010, p. 260) 
This test proposal for juridical contexts is a specific implementation of 
the following general test procedure:  
(Test) c rather than c* causes e rather than e* if and only if 
(typically) if c* would have occurred, then e* would have 
occurred (2010, p. 262) 
The underlying idea is that we should not consider all the possible 
situations in which c did not occur, since this could include situations 
that are irrelevant for the causal relation. We need to limit the number 
of alternatives to be considered in the counterfactual test. Schaffer does 
this by demanding that the counterfactual test does not simply consider 
the non-occurrence of c or e, but instead positively states the relevant 
alternatives that have to be considered, namely c* and e*.  
It is in this alternative, superior test procedure that Schaffer locates 
the positive effect of a contrastive ontology. It allows better focus: 
First, instead of looking at scenarios in which the defendant’s 
actual breach of duty did not occur (which might involve 
scenarios in which the defendant acts unlawfully in some other 
way), one is specifically instructed to consider the alternative 
supposition of lawful conduct for the defendant. Second, 
instead of then looking to see whether the actual harm to the 
plaintiff would still have occurred (when it might merely have 
been replaced by some equal or worse harm instead), one is 
specifically guided to look for the alternative of a 
comparatively better outcome for the plaintiff. An explicitly 
contrastive approach can thus potentially help the lawyer 
phrase her causal question in a more explicit way. (2010, p. 260) 
In sum, a contrastive ontology with its associated, superior test 
procedure allows lawyers and judges to focus on what is really 
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important causal knowledge for them. This is the advantage of a 
contrastive causal ontology in juridical contexts.  
2.5 To facilitate comparison with causal claims in genetics and in 
physics, we briefly summarise Schaffer’s views by means of the three 
questions presented at the end of the introduction: 
(1-L) In the field of law, the ontology of the causal relation is 
quaternary. Binary or ternary causal claims are ambiguous and 
therefore do not have a fixed truth value. 
(2-L) The causal contrast is always a form of lawful conduct. The 
effectual contrast always a better outcome. 
(3-L) Making the causal contrast and effectual contrast explicit is 
helpful because it allows lawyers and judges to focus on causal 
claims that are juridically relevant. By introducing these 
contrasts, they can identify the one and only specific 
(quaternary) claim that is relevant, thus discarding all the others 
as irrelevant and unworthy of further investigation. 
With respect to the fourth question, Schaffer’s views imply that 
awareness of the contrastive nature of causal claims in the law helps us 
to understand what is going on in causal talk in juridical contexts. More 
specifically, the idea of contrastiveness is a tool that reveals that causal 
talk in the law has a surface structure and a (more complicated) deep 
structure. Let us use Schaffer’s lifeguard example to illustrate this. 
Suppose we hear two lawyers argue which of the following possibilities 
is correct: 
The fact that the lifeguard fell asleep is a cause / not a cause of 
the drowning of the boy. 
By means of a contrastive ontology, we can understand that what these 
lawyers are really arguing about is the following: 
102 E. WEBER & I. DE BAL 
 
The fact that the lifeguard fell asleep, as opposed to paying 
attention, is a cause / not a cause of the drowning of the boy. 
The lawyers do not mention the causal contrast explicitly, because they 
assume that they share this contrast. Our answer to the fourth question 
for juridical contexts is: 
(4-L) The general insight that the causal ontology in the law is 
contrastive is useful because it lays bare tacit, shared 
assumptions that allow the surface structure of the causal talk to 
be simpler than its deep structure.  
3 Contrastive causation in genetics 
3.1 Let us go back to the quote from Schaffer in the Introduction:  
Arguably, causal and explanatory judgments in the sciences are 
always contrastive judgments. (2010, p. 263) 
This is a very strong claim, because it contains two universal 
quantifiers: all the sciences and all causal and explanatory judgments. 
Providing sufficient evidence for that claim is a huge task, and given its 
boldness the probability that it is false is extremely high. We assume 
that Schaffer is aware of that, and that his claim should rather be read 
as a description of a possible research route: like he has done for 
causation in the law, it is an interesting project to investigate 
contrastiveness of causal claims in several scientific disciplines. This is 
what we do in the remainder of this paper. We focus on the normative 
side: we will investigate to what extent non-binary (ternary, 
quaternary, …) causal ontologies are beneficial for specific groups of 
scientists. We start with genetics (Section 3.2 – 3.4) and then discuss 
examples from physics (Section 4). This kind of investigation is similar 
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to what Schaffer has done in his 2010 paper with respect to a 
quaternary causal ontology for lawyers and judges.  
3.2 In genetics, an important class of causal claims relates specific 
genotypes to specific phenotypes.3 Genotypes are said to cause certain 
phenotypes. A phenotype is “any measurable characteristic or 
distinctive trait possessed by an organism” (Elrod & Stansfield 2010, p. 
23). Examples are: the colour of an organism’s hair or the colour of an 
organism’s eyes. Genotypes are the genetic basis – or cause – of these 
distinctive traits. They are the collection of alleles (alternative forms of 
a gene) possessed by the organism. Here is an example of the type of 
claim we consider: 
Normal leg size, characteristic of Kerry-type cattle, is produced 
by the homozygous genotype DD. Short-legged Dexter-type 
cattle possess the heterozygous genotype Dd. The homozygous 
genotype dd is lethal, producing grossly deformed stillbirths 
called ‘bulldog calves’. (Elrod & Stansfield 2010, p. 49) 
Homozygous genotypes are characterized by having identical alleles, 
for example DD, which is a combination of the allele D with itself. 
Heterozygous genotypes have different alleles, for example Dd. The 
claim above expresses that the structure of the genotype causes the 
nature of the phenotype (namely whether the cattle has normal size 
legs, short legs, or is grossly deformed). The genotype of the animal 
determines which of the three phenotypes it will exhibit. Consider 
another example: 
 
                                                             
3 Another important class of causal claims is those claims that relate the genotypes of 
the two parents in a cross to the genotype of the offspring. We do not use such claims 
here, though a similar argument could be developed by means of claims of this type. 
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Ebony (black) body color in Drosophila (fruit fly) is governed by 
a recessive, mutant allele e, while wild-type body color is grey 
and is governed by a dominant allele e+. Thus, a fly with both e+ 
alleles (e+/ e+) or with a dominant e+ and a recessive e allele (e+/ 
e) will have a grey body. However, a fly with both recessive e 
alleles (e / e) will be black. (Elrod & Stansfield 2010, p. 25) 
Again, the configuration of the genotype is said to determine the 
occurrence of the specific phenotype. The only difference is that, in the 
case of the cattle, there were three possible outcomes, while in this case 
the fruit fly has only two possible colours. We come back to this 
difference at the beginning of Section 3.4.  
3.3 We will now argue for the use of a contrastive ontology when 
making claims of this type. As in our discussion of juridical cases, we 
start with contrasts on the cause side and then proceed to contrasts on 
the effect side. 
Consider the colour of guinea pigs: they are either black or white. 
The colour is determined by a pair of genes (B and b). With respect to 
the phenotypic expression of these genes, we have three causal laws: 
All BB animals are black. 
All Bb animals are black. 
All bb animals are white. (Elrod & Stanfield 2010, p. 28) 
Take a black guinea pig a. In accordance with the laws above, the 
following claims hold: 
(D) The fact that animal a has genotype BB, as opposed to bb is 
cause of a being black. 
(E) The fact that animal a has genotype BB, as opposed to Bb is not a 
cause of a being black. 
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If animal a would have had genotype Bb instead of BB, it would still have 
been black. But if animal a would have had genotype bb, instead of BB, it 
would have been white. Now consider a white guinea pig c. According to 
the laws above, the following claims hold: 
(F) The fact that animal c has genotype bb, as opposed to Bb is a 
cause of c being white. 
(G) The fact that animal c has genotype bb, as opposed to BB is a 
cause of a being white. 
When we try to express these claims in a binary way, we run into 
some troubles. To show this, first consider a (non-problematic) binary 
claim about the white guinea pig: 
(H) The fact that animal c has genotype bb is a cause of c being 
white. 
This claim is not confusing, since any contrast in the set of relevant 
alternatives (Bb and BB) will validate it. There is, in other words, no 
relevant contrast that makes this claim invalid. The contrast does not 
matter for the truth value of the causal claim and is thus irrelevant. So 
far so good. The situation is different for a binary claim expressing 
causation about the colour of the black guinea pig a.  
(I) The fact that animal a has genotype BB is a cause of a being 
black. 
This claim is confusing. As is clear from (E), there are cases when this 
claim is not valid, namely when the alternative genotype of the animal 
would have been Bb. So, if we do not specify the considered alternative, 
we run the risk of making invalid causal claims. Given that there are 
situations when binary causal claims create confusion, geneticists may 
indeed benefit from a ternary causal ontology.  
The case of the guinea pigs is no exception at all. Tomato plants with 
hairy stems result from the dominant gene H, while hairless stems are 
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produced by the recessive gene h. This can be expressed by the 
following laws: 
 All HH plants are hairy. 
 All Hh plants are hairy. 
 All hh plants are hairless. (Ibid, p. 48) 
It is easily seen that this case fits the same pattern as our guinea pig 
example. When we want to make a causal claim about hairy plants, we 
need to specify the considered alternative to ensure that our claim is 
valid.  
3.4 The two examples above, like the one about the fruit flies, all deal 
with cases where there are only two possibilities for the phenotype. In 
case of the fruit fly, its colour was black or grey; the tomato plant was 
hairy or hairless and the guinea pig was black or white. This ensures 
that there is no need to specify the contrast on the effect side: there is 
only one possible contrast. Suppose we reformulate (1) as follows: 
(D’) The fact that animal a has genotype BB, as opposed to bb is 
cause of a being black as opposed to white. 
Stating that a guinea pig is black, instead of white, when those are the 
only two possible colours, is unnecessary.  
However, there are many cases where we do have more than two 
possibilities for the resulting phenotype, for example the leg length of 
cattle as mentioned above. These cases may need something extra: a 
quaternary ontology instead of a ternary one. Let us investigate this. 
Snapdragons are a type of flower that can have red, white or pink 
flowers. Their colour is linked to the genes R and r in the following way: 
 All RR flowers are red. 
 All Rr flowers are pink. 
 All rr flowers are white. (Ibid, p. 29) 
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Consider the following quaternary causal claims about a pink flower a: 
(J) The fact that flower a has genotype Rr, as opposed to RR, is a 
cause of a being pink as opposed to red. 
(K) The fact that flower a has genotype Rr, as opposed to RR, is not 
a cause of a being pink as opposed to white. 
When we try to express this in a ternary way, without specifying the 
contrast in the effect, we run into the same problems as before. The 
corresponding ternary claim is: 
(L) The fact that flower a has genotype Rr, as opposed to RR, is a 
cause of a being pink. 
Since this ternary claim can be specified into both a valid (J) and an 
invalid causal claim (K), it creates confusion. The ternary claim does not 
capture the entire meaning of the causal relation, and thus we need a 
quaternary one, specifying both the contrast on the cause and effect 
side. 
Another example is the blood group system of humans. There are 
three possible alleles: IA, IB, i and four possible blood groups: 
 All IAIA humans have blood group A. 
 All IAi humans have blood group A. 
  All IBIB humans have blood group B. 
 All IBi humans have blood group B. 
 All IAIB humans have blood group AB. 
 All ii humans have blood group O. (Ibid, p. 46) 
It is clear that geneticists again need a quaternary ontology to avoid 
confusion when making causal claims. 
3.5 Let us take stock by going back to our four lead questions. Sections 
3.2-3.4 support the following answers to the first three questions: 
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(1-G) In the field of genetics, the ontology of the causal relation is 
quaternary. Many binary or ternary causal claims are ambiguous 
and therefore do not have a fixed truth value. 
(2-G) All alternative genotypes can be causal contrasts, all alternative 
phenotypes can be effectual contrasts. 
(3-G) Making the causal and effectual contrast explicit is useful because 
it gives the geneticists an overview of all the different causal 
claims that can be made. These causal claims are equally 
interesting and have to be investigated and argued for separately. 
Comparing (3-L) with (3-G) is interesting: in the context of genetics the 
contrasts widen our perspective, while in legal contexts they narrow 
down our perspective. So the benefits of the contrastive ontology are 
different. 
In order to address the fourth question, we have to look at genetics 
from the outside. We propose the following answer: 
(4-G) The general insight that the causal ontology is contrastive is a 
clue to understand why geneticists cannot make simpler, binary 
causal claims without confusing the issues they are investigating.  
4 Contrastive causation in physics 
4.1 In this section we will argue that causal claims in physics also 
presuppose a contrastive ontology. Like in the juridical and genetical 
cases, we start with contrasts on the cause side (4.2) and then proceed 
to contrasts on the effect side (4.3). In 4.4 we try to derive general 
insights from 4.2 and 4.3 by means of our four lead questions. 
The physical examples we use below relate to the thermal expansion 
of aluminium rods. There is a functional relation between the rate of 
change in temperature and the rate of expansion of the rod. Take 𝐿0 to 
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be the initial length of the rod (in meters), 𝑑𝑇 to be the temperature 
difference (in C°) and 𝑑𝐿 the change in length, aka the expansion (in 
meters). Then the following law holds for aluminium rods: 
𝑑𝐿 = 0.0000222 × 𝐿0 × 𝑑𝑇 
Analogous laws with a different parameter hold for other materials. 
Besides the (symmetrical) functional relationship, there is also an 
asymmetrical causal connection: one can change the length by 
changing the temperature, but not the other way around. 
4.2 Before we look at physical examples, we want to present a medical 
toy example (which is inspired by an example developed in Hitchcock 
1996). Consider the following ternary causal claim: 
(M) The fact that John took a 100 mg dose of this drug, as opposed to 
no dose at all, is a cause of his recovery. 
We assume that this is true (i.e. John would not have recovered without 
taking the drug, or his chance of recovery would be significantly lower). 
Let us assume that taking more than 100 mg is ineffective. Then the 
following ternary causal claim is false: 
(N) The fact that John took a 100 mg dose of this drug, as opposed to 
200 mg, is a cause of his recovery. 
Given that the first ternary claim is true and the second one is false, we 
have to conclude that the corresponding binary claim is confusing: 
(O) The fact that John took a 100 mg dose of this drug is a cause of 
his recovery. 
This claim does not have a fixed truth value. 
With respect to thermal expansion, a similar point can be made. 
First, consider a ternary causal claim that is true: 
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(P) Increasing the temperature of this aluminium rod from 50° to 
250°C, as opposed to keeping it constant, caused an increase of 
its length. 
Next, consider a ternary causal claim that is false: 
(Q) Increasing the temperature of this aluminium rod from 50° to 
250°C, as opposed to increasing in from 50° to 100°C, caused an 
increase of its length. 
This causal claim would be true if there would be an expansion 
threshold (a minimal increase in temperature below which change in 
temperature does not cause expansion). Since there is no such 
threshold (cf. the law above, which excludes this) the ternary claim is 
false. Hence, we can conclude that the corresponding binary claim is 
confusing: 
(R) Increasing the temperature of this aluminium rod from 50° to 
250°C caused an increase of its length. 
This claim does not have a fixed truth value. 
4.3 Let us now look at contrasts of the effect side. All metals have a 
melting point, that of aluminium is 660,3°C.4 Melting points constrain 
the range within which functional laws like the one given in 4.1 are 
valid. Consider the following ternary causal claim: 
(S) Increasing the temperature of this aluminium rod from 50° to 
250°C, as opposed to increasing it from 50° to 800°C, caused an 
increase of its length. 
 
                                                             
4 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing at this convenient possibility for 
introducing contrasts on the effect side. 
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At first sight, this claim seems to be false, for the same reason as (Q) is 
false. However, there is a quaternary elaboration of this claim that is 
true: 
(T) Increasing the temperature of this aluminium rod from 50° to 
250°C, as opposed to increasing in from 50° to 800°C, caused an 
increase in length rather than melting. 
The truth value of the ternary claim (S) is not fixed. 
4.4 Let us now go back to our four lead questions. Our thermal 
expansion case supports the following answer to the first question: 
(1-P) In the field of physics, the ontology of the causal relation is 
quaternary. Many binary or ternary causal claims are 
ambiguous and therefore do not have a fixed truth value. 
We have only given examples about thermal expansion, but it is obvious 
that the relevant features (viz. threshold or not; and limited range of 
validity of a functional law) are present in many other subdisciplines of 
physics. 
With respect to the content of the contrast, we can conclude: 
(2-P) All alternative states of cause variables can be causal 
contrasts. Interesting effectual contrasts often can be 
found by considering radically different behaviour (such 
as melting as opposed to expanding/contracting). 
As to the two remaining questions, it is convenient to reverse the 
order. Causal talk in physics seems to be constrained by (at least) two 
pieces of background knowledge. The first is that the claims are never 
universally valid, but only within contextually determined “normal” 
conditions. For instance, in the context of thermal expansion of solids, 
it is implicitly assumed that the validity of the causal claims is limited to 
temperatures below the melting point of the solids involved. If we talk 
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about heating and expansion of gases, there is an implicit assumption 
that we confine ourselves to ranges where the container of the gas does 
not explode. The second piece of background knowledge is that the 
functional laws that govern the processes considered often exclude 
thresholds and imply a continuous “dose-response” relationship. 
Hence, our answer to the fourth question here resembles our answer for 
juridical contexts: 
(4-P) The general insight that the causal ontology in physics is 
contrastive is useful because it lays bare tacit, shared background 
knowledge that allows the surface structure of the causal talk to 
be simpler than its deep structure. 
With respect to the third question, it seems that the background 
knowledge we referred to above suffices to avoid confusion. Within the 
range of contexts demarcated by the background knowledge (viz. 
“normal” contexts that are governed by continuous functional laws 
without threshold conditions), the truth value of a causal claim is not 
influenced by the chosen contrasts. So our answer is: 
(3-P) In physics, it is not necessary to make the causal or effectual 
contrast explicit. 
5 Conclusion 
We have argued that in each of three domains considered (law, genetics 
and physics) the ontology of causal claims is quaternary. In each 
domain, many binary or ternary causal claims are ambiguous and do 
not have a fixed truth value.  
This similarity, expressed in the conjunction of (1-L), (1-G) and (1-P), 
is the only substantial conclusion we can draw that is valid across the 
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domains considered here. A contrastive ontology can be beneficial for a 
number of reasons. In the three domains we have discussed there is a 
variety of such reasons, which are described in (3-L), (3-P), (3-G), (4-L), 
(4-P) and (4-G). 
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